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This article examines a separation made in the literature between three 
waves in globalisation theory – globalist, sceptical and post-sceptical or 
transformationalist - and argues that this literature requires a new look. The 
article is a critique of the third of these waves and its relationship with the 
second wave. Contributors to the third wave defend the idea of globalisation 
from criticism by the sceptics but also try to construct a more complex and 
qualified theory of globalisation than provided by first wave accounts. The 
core new argument of this article is that third wave authors come to 
conclusions that try to defend globalisation yet include qualifications that in 
practice reaffirm sceptical claims. This feature of the literature has been 
overlooked in debates and the aim of this article is to revisit the area and 
identify and bring out this problem. This has political implications. Third 
wavers propose globalist cosmopolitan democracy when the substance of 
their arguments do more in practice to bolster the sceptical view of politics 
based around inequality and conflict, nation-states and regional blocs, and 
alliances of common interest or ideology, rather than cosmopolitan global 
structures. 
 
 
Some recent contributions in the globalisation literature have identified three waves 
or perspectives in globalisation theory – globalists, sceptics and 
transformationalists or post-sceptics (eg Held et al 1999; Holton 2005). 
Globalisation theory, seen to have started in about the 1980s, is said to have 
begun with strong accounts of the globalisation of economy, politics and culture 
and the sweeping away of the significance of territorial boundaries and national 
economies, states and cultures. Ohmae (1990, 1995) is often picked out as an 
example of this wave in globalisation theory and other proponents are said by 
some to include writers like Reich (1991) and Albrow (1996) and discourses in the 
business world, media and politics (Hay and Marsh 2000: 4. One example is Blair 
1997). The first wave in globalisation theory is said to have a ‘hyper’ globalist 
account of the economy where national economies are much less significant or 
even no longer existent because of the role of capital mobility, multinational 
corporations and economic interdependency. Because of reduced political 
restrictions on the movement of money and technological change in the form of the 
computerisation of financial transactions, large amounts of money can be moved 
almost instantaneously with little to constrain it within national boundaries. Many 
corporations are seen now to be multinational rather than national, in their 
ownership and internationally distributed production facilities, workforces and 
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consumers. Such corporations that often get mentioned include Coca-Cola and 
McDonalds, or media multinationals such as News Corporation that have stakes in 
many forms of media, from newspapers to book publishing, the internet and TV, 
and across different areas of the globe (Thompson 1995; McChesney 1999). 
Consequently the global economy is seen to have opened up, integrated and 
included more parts of the world, although whether this has been a positive thing 
or not is debated – both Marxists and economic liberals have seen the world as 
very globalised and can agree on it as a fact whilst disagreeing whether it is good 
one or not (eg Sklair 2002; Wolf 2004). Along such lines there is also debate about 
whether opening up and integration has happened or globalisation has had an 
equalising and levelling effect or not (eg Wolf and Wade 2002; Friedman 2006).  
 
The globalist perspective is sometimes seen as quite economistic (Held et al 1999: 
3-4) with economic changes having political and cultural implications. Nation-states 
lose power and influence or even sovereignty because they have to (or choose to) 
tailor their policies to the needs of mobile capital, with consequences for the 
viability of social democracy or the welfare state which are curtailed to fit in with the 
wishes of business interests (eg Gray 1996; Strange 1996; Cerny and Evans 2004; 
Crouch 2004). Culturally it is said to lead to the decline of national cultures and 
more homogenised (or sometimes hybridised) global cultures where national 
differences become less marked as globally people consume culture from around 
the world rather than so exclusively from their own nation (Tomlinson 1999; Sklair 
2002; Nederveen Pieterse 2004). This is facilitated further by global electronic 
communications, such as the internet, globalised TV broadcasts, migration and 
tourism. The role of new technologies has made globalisation seem to some a 
relatively recent thing, perhaps of the post-1960s or post-1980s period (eg Scholte 
2005). Politically nation-states in the hyperglobalist perspective are also seen to be 
superseded by international organisations such as the UN and IMF, social 
movements which are global or even a global civil society (eg Gill 2000; Keane 
2003). Economically, politically and culturally globalists see transnational, global 
forces taking over from nations as the main sources of economy, sovereignty and 
identity. For some this means that social science has to move away from a 
methodological nationalism it is attached to, even from ideas of society to more 
cosmopolitan and global perspectives on social relations (eg Beck 2006; Urry 
2000; but see a response from Outhwaite 2006).   
 
Then, it is said by writers on the three waves, there was a more sober set of 
accounts that reacted against this with scepticism and argued that globalisation is 
not new and that probably the processes being described are not very global either 
(eg Hirst and Thompson 1996. See also Krugman 1996). I will return to second 
and third wave perspectives in more detail throughout this article and wish to avoid 
repetition but an initial outline can be made here. Sceptics are concerned with the 
abstract nature of globalist perspectives, which seem to be thin on empirical 
substantiation and make sweeping claims about processes as if they affect all 
areas of the world evenly and with the same responses. They see evidence of the 
continuing role of nation-states, both within their own boundaries and as agents of 
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the transnational processes of globalisation, through which they maintain as much 
as lose power. In the cases of the core, for instance in North America and Europe, 
states continue to be very powerful. National identities have a history and a hold on 
popular imagination that global identities cannot replace, evolving rather than being 
swept away, and there may even be evidence of a resurgence of nationalism as 
old nations come under challenge but from strongly held smaller nationalisms as 
much as from transnationalism (eg see Smith 1990; Kennedy and Danks 2001).  
 
Sceptics have wanted to test the claims of globalism against evidence, and when 
they have done so have sometimes found it wanting. They have also been 
concerned to see whether globalisation is received evenly and with the same 
response everywhere and, not surprisingly, have found signs of differentiation in its 
spread. Sceptics have tended to see the global economy as not globally inclusive. 
For instance areas of sub-Saharan Africa are much less integrated than the 
powerhouses of East Asia, Europe and North America, with global inequality rising 
and protectionism still rife, for example in Europe and the USA in response to 
imports from growing Asian economies. As we shall see sceptics argue that the 
global economy is inter-nationalised and triadic rather than global and that its 
internationalisation is not unprecedented in recent years, in fact that it may even 
have been more internationalised a hundred years ago than it is now (see also 
Osterhammel and Petersson 2005 and O’Rourke and Williamson 1999 on 
historical forms of globalisation and, going even further back in history, Frank and 
Gills 1993 and Abu-Lughod 1989). Whether globalisation or free trade, insofar as 
there really is free trade, is the answer to global poverty is questioned. Liberal 
policies and integration into the global economy may have helped some parts of 
the world, China, India and other parts of Asia for example. But in these places 
protectionism and state intervention may also have been an important part of the 
story, and other parts of the world, in Africa for example, have fallen prey to greater 
inequality and poverty while globalisation has progressed and are increasingly less 
likely to stand any chance in the open global economy which some see as the 
solution to their problems (eg Rodrik 2000; Wolf and Wade 2002; Kaplinsky 2005). 
 
Politically the effects of globalisation could be said to be uneven – states have 
gained as well as lost powers in processes of globalisation, many states are more 
powerful than others globally and some are able to continue with more social 
democratic policies in defiance of hyperglobalist perspectives which see pressure 
from globalisation for compliance with neoliberalism (Mann 1997; Mosley 2005). 
This suggests nation-states retain autonomy and sovereignty in many ways, and 
unevenly so (see also Weiss 1998). Bodies like the UN seem to be as much inter-
national as transnational, composed of nation-states and driven by them as much 
as above and beyond them. Global governance, from the UN Security Council to 
agreements on global warming, nuclear proliferation and international justice, is 
treated with scepticism by some critics, seen as inevitably the tool of the most 
powerful nations, who bypass or exempt themselves from their rules when it 
doesn’t suit them, and use such bodies to impose their will for their own benefit 
when it does (Zolo 1997, 2002).  
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Culturally it is said that nations may well respond to globalisation differently. 
Macdonalds may have proliferated around the world, but the ingredients vary to fit 
in with local customs (from shrimp burgers in Japan to kosher burgers for Jewish 
customers), its consumers are more working class or middle class depending on 
location, and eating customs vary from fast to leisurely in different contexts. From 
France to parts of the Middle-East not everyone responds positively to the 
globalisation of American culture. In fact a retreat to fundamentalism and greater 
rather than lesser nationalism are seen to be notable reactions to globalisation in 
some places (Robins 1997). It is noteworthy too that it is the culture of one nation, 
America, that is often talked about in relation to cultural globalisation, as much as 
culture originating from all around the world (Beck et al 2003). There have even 
been well known predictions of clashes of culture arising from globalisation, 
against hyper-globalist assumptions about the homogenisation or hybridisation of 
culture (Barber 1996; Huntingdon 1996). However such clashes, insofar as they 
are real, may be to do with economic interest and foreign policy more than culture, 
and ideas of civilisational clashes often over-homogenise cultures and have the 
effect of demonising them and provoking clashes as much as accurately analysing 
the world. Sceptics like Hirst and Thompson would not want to have too much to 
do with the suggestion of a clash of civilisations. Nevertheless such perspectives 
are amongst those which are sceptical about the growth of globalised culture.  
 
However there have been another set of reactions alongside and in response to 
the sceptic alternative to hyperglobalism. There are those who share the concerns 
of the sceptics about evidence and differentiation but can’t help but see processes 
of globalisation before their eyes, moving ahead at unprecedented levels in recent 
times. Economic interdependency, for instance, is seen as having grown 
significantly so that national economies are no longer contained within national 
territorial boundaries. Third wavers have been keen to critically reassess the 
claims of globalism but without throwing out the baby with the bathwater (eg Held 
et al 1999 and Held and McGrew 2003 who name Giddens 1990 and Rosenau 
1997 as other fellow ‘transformationalists’). The outcome of this has been a 
departure from some of the conclusions of sceptics and instead a more complex 
picture of globalisation, in which globalisation is seen as occurring but without just 
sweeping all away before it, as hyper-globalists might have it (see also Scholte 
2005).  
 
The global nature of institutions such as finance, problems such as the 
environment, drugs and crime and developments in international communications 
and transport lead to more global political forms. National economic, political and 
cultural forces are transformed and have to share their sovereignty with other 
entities (of global governance and international law, as well as with mobile capital, 
multi-national corporations and global social movements) but they are not 
removed. Globalisation may have a differentiated effect depending on type (eg, 
economic, cultural or political) or location where it is experienced, whilst still being 
a force. Global inequality is seen as having moved from a simple core-periphery 
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shape to more of a three tier structure including a middle group, without clear 
geographical demarcations because, for instance, the marginalised may live in the 
same cities as the elites (eg Hoogvelt 1997; Bauman 1998). All of these involve 
both the continuation and transformation of existing structures, something in 
between what is described by sceptics and hyper-globalists.  
 
Globalisation’s future may be uncertain and open-ended, it could take different 
forms (perhaps more neoliberal or more social democratic) or even be reversed, 
rather than the future being one of unavoidable globalisation or just continuity with 
unaffected nation-state structures. With a recognition of uncertainty comes a 
recognition of the importance of agency in deciding what happens to globalisation 
rather than an assumption that it is predetermined or inevitable, as is suggested is 
the case in some first wave accounts (Holton 2005).  
 
In short a third wave has emerged which is critical of hyperglobalism and wishes to 
formulate a more sophisticated picture but feels, contrary to scepticism, that 
globalisation is changing the world. Third wave perspectives have been ones that 
do not go as far as the sceptics in that they do not deny that real significant 
changes have happened. They acknowledge the reality of globalising changes and 
so defend a globalist position but one that is modified to be more complex than that 
of the hyperglobalists. To avoid repetition I will not dwell further just yet on the 
claims of the third wave. This article is focused on this third wave in globalisation 
theory and we will see more of its detailed claims on economy, politics and culture 
as the article proceeds.  
 
The table below summarises the three waves or perspectives as they have been 
presented in the literature. The table presents images of the three waves. 
Individual contributors, including those cited above, do not always fit only into one 
wave, and, as we shall see, one wave presents itself in one way but when you look 
more closely at the details seems to actually reinforce one of the other waves it 
seeks to criticise.  So the emphasis in this table is on how the three waves are 
presented. What the reality is, is explored in the rest of this article. (See also Held 
et al 1999: 10). 
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Table 1: Images of the Three Waves 
 
 Globalists Sceptics Transformationalists 
Globalisation Globalisation 
Globalisation as 
causal 
 
 
Globalisation is a 
discourse 
Internationalisation 
as effect of other 
causes 
 
Global 
transformations, but 
differentiation and 
embeddedness 
 
Method Abstract, general 
approach 
Empirical 
approach 
Qualitative rather than 
quantitative approach 
Economy Global economy 
Integration, open 
Free trade 
Inter-national 
economy 
Triadic, regional, 
unequal 
State intervention 
and protectionism 
Globally transformed 
New stratification 
Globalised but 
differentiated 
Politics Global 
governance or 
neo-liberalism 
Decline of nation-
state 
Loss of national 
sovereignty 
Nation-states, 
regional blocs, 
inter-national 
Power and 
inequality 
Political agency 
possible 
Politics globally 
transformed 
Nation-states 
important but 
reconstructed 
Sovereignty shared 
Culture Homogenisation Clashes of culture 
Nationalism 
Americanisation 
Globalisation  
differentiated 
Globally transformed 
Hybridisation 
Complex, 
differentiated 
globalisation 
History Globalisation is 
new 
Internationalisation 
is old 
Globalisation old but 
present forms 
unprecedented 
Normative 
politics 
Global 
governance or 
neoliberalism 
End of social 
democratic 
welfare state 
Reformist social 
democracy and 
international 
regulation possible 
 
Cosmopolitan 
democracy 
Future Globalisation Nation-state, triad, 
conflicts, inequality 
Uncertain, agency 
Left or Right 
Continued, stalled or 
reversed 
 
 
The three waves identified 
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The three waves are not absolutely clear-cut from one another. Some authors fit 
into more than one perspective, although in this article I suggest this leads to some 
contradictions. But they do show different waves, tendencies or perspectives in 
globalisation theory. I am focusing here on this third wave and will be looking at: 
Hay and Marsh (2000) who outline three waves and associate themselves with 
what they see as an emerging third wave; and Held et al (1999) who outline three 
perspectives which match the three waves - they define their views in terms of the 
third perspective, transformationalism, which has similarities with Hay and Marsh’s 
third wave (see also Held and McGrew 2003). I will look briefly at Scholte’s (2005) 
concept of globalisation. This does not explicitly talk of three waves, but his 
approach is based on giving a more complex definition of globalisation than more 
extreme globalists but in a way which tries to keep up globalisation rather than 
lapsing into scepticism. In this way, Scholte is in practice a third waver on 
globalisation.  
 
For reasons of space and to ensure greater depth of analysis I focus in this article 
on particular representatives of scepticism and transformationalism or post-
scepticism. I focus on Hirst and Thompson (1996) and Held at el (1999) as they 
are widely seen as representatives of the second and third waves respectively, 
much read and cited as such, and rightly so as their perspectives are theoretically 
and empirically developed, and have addressed each others findings (eg Open 
Democracy 2002). Hay and Marsh (2000) I focus on because they have reflected 
explicitly on the second and third waves, advocated the latter, and have been cited 
as important authors in this area (see Holton 2005). Some third wavers practice a 
third perspective but without such a conscious reflection on the fact as in the case 
of Hay and Marsh. Scholte (2005) falls into the former category. He does not refer 
to the waves idea but his ideas include all the characteristics of the third wave. His 
book is clear, accessible, user-friendly and widely discussed and cited. He 
provides a good example of the third wave in practice and the tensions that I wish 
to discuss in this article.  
 
A number of others such as Hopkins (2002), Cameron and Palan (2004), Holton 
(2005) and Hopper (2007), also identify three waves but without going into any 
greater detail on this issue than the above thinkers. Kofman and Youngs (1996) 
made an early brief outline of perspectives on globalisation but discuss two waves 
rather than three. That they have done this is significant for my argument and I will 
come to their approach at the end of this article.  
 
Bruff (2005) talks about three waves but in a way which categorises them 
differently, his first wave including more moderate globalisers such as Held and 
Scholte who most others categorise within the third wave, hyperglobalists excluded 
from the first wave within which most place them, and his third wave including neo-
Gramscian and poststructuralist perspectives. This article touches on the power of 
discourse as highlighted in neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist perspectives but 
there is not space here to expand further on such approaches. Neo-Gramscian 
and post-structuralist perspectives like those of Bruff and Cameron and Palan 
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(2004) provide important advances in discussions of globalisation perspectives but 
my argument is that there is a problem in some of the earlier waves debates that 
has gone without being noted, that third wave theories reinforce the scepticism 
they seek to undermine. Alongside some of the more recent discussions which 
take debates forward I think it is important to return to this earlier problem which 
has not been previously identified and needs to be brought out in the literature.  
 
There is a large and growing literature on cultural globalisation (Tomlinson 1999; 
Nederveen Pieterse 2004) and on areas such as transnational civil society (Keane 
2003). There is not space in this article to cover all areas of globalisation studies 
so I will focus primarily on the economic and political dimensions of globalisation 
that are a main emphasis of some of the authors I am looking at, although I hope 
that I have highlighted some of the cultural dimensions above.  
 
Beyond the second wave? 
 
This article is concerned with the second and third waves of globalisation theory. 
The first wave is seen by those in the second and third waves as having 
exaggerated the extent of globalisation, and as having argued for globalisation in 
an abstract and generalising way which does not account sufficiently for empirical 
evidence or for unevenness and agency in processes of globalisation. Third wave 
theorists try, to different degrees, to distance themselves from both more radical 
globalists and outright sceptics. They try to defend an idea of globalisation, and so 
distance themselves from the sceptics, but in a more complicated way than has 
been put forward by the first wave. My core argument is that in doing this they add 
qualifications and complexities which actually bolster second wave sceptic 
arguments. This is not always the case and there are some differences between 
third wavers and sceptics. But third wavers in trying to rescue globalisation theory 
by adding complexities and qualifications actually in some ways undermine it and 
add to the case for the sceptics.  
 
Third wave analysis claims to either rescue globalist arguments (Held et al 1999) 
or to have a more sophisticated advance on second wave arguments (Hay and 
Marsh 2000). As such it directs readers away from sceptical viewpoints to either a 
modified globalism (Held et al) or what is said to be a more sophisticated 
scepticism (Hay and Marsh), the latter of which is couched in terms which accept a 
form of globalisation as an actuality. The theory of second wave sceptics is 
projected as a weaker analysis. But if it transpires that third wavers are in fact 
confirming the second wave, whether they intend to or not, then it is important that 
the sceptical view is validated rather than treated as a less adequate analysis as it 
is by third wavers who are claiming to be able to provide something better. Getting 
a correct understanding of what the third wave is actually saying is important to us 
understanding globalisation properly. Sceptics and third wavers have argued the 
toss over which of their perspectives is more adequate (eg, Open Democracy 
2002) but if it is the case that in fact third wavers are in practice reinforcing second 
wave scepticism then this new dimension needs to be identified.  
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As I will outline in more detail later, a side-effect is that there are political 
consequences of this. By drawing globalist conclusions, albeit more complex ones, 
from their analysis, and arguing they have shown the flaws in scepticism, some 
third wavers, such as Held et al, then go on to conclude that forms of politics such 
as cosmopolitan global democracy are the most appropriate ways for trying to 
direct globalisation along more progressive paths. Surmising that their analysis 
supports globalist perspectives leads them to such conclusions. By drawing 
conclusions which go against scepticism they undermine the sceptical analysis of 
politics which argues for a more realist view of the world in which such global forms 
are not possible because of the superior power of advanced states, especially 
western states and the G3, the conflicting interests and ideologies of global actors, 
and the importance of politics at the level of nation-states, regional blocs and other 
alliances.  
 
Sceptical analysis leads to conclusions which stress power, inequality, conflict and 
the importance of the nation-state, all of which point to a politics other than (or as 
well as) global democracy. This might rely on states, political alliances at a more 
decentralised level between states with similar objectives or interests, for instance 
perhaps a shared antipathy to what are perceived as neoliberalism or US 
imperialism, and specific global social movements who have related objectives. 
This is rather than, or in addition to, more global universal structures, in which 
common agreement may not be possible and which may be hijacked by more 
powerful actors. If third wave analysis leads more in the direction of the sceptics’ 
findings than it says it does, as is the argument of this article, then an analysis of 
global power inequalities and nation-state power in political strategy, of the sort 
highlighted by the sceptics, should become more part of the picture and 
cosmopolitan global democracy looks more problematic. It may be significant that 
Hay and Marsh do not show the same faith in cosmopolitan global democracy as 
Held et al. Their political conclusions are based more around the possibilities of 
nation-state politics. This may be one reason why, as we shall see, they teeter 
between the second and third waves in their chapter on the topic.   
 
The second wave 
 
Much of my case will be about what implications third wave argument has for the 
second wave. In order to pursue this I need first to lay out some of the claims of 
the second wave. When looking at the third wave we can then compare 
arguments. The crux of this article is an argument about the status of third wave 
arguments in relation to second wave arguments, but for this to be made an outline 
of both waves is necessary. To do this I will focus on Hirst and Thompson’s 
arguments. Hirst and Thompson (1996) are frequently cited as leading proponents 
of the sceptical point of view and have engaged directly in discussions with third 
wavers, for instance in Paul Hirst’s Open Democracy (2002) debate with David 
Held. Theoretically and empirically their analysis makes them a good choice to 
focus on for an outline of the sceptic case.  
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Hirst and Thompson’s analysis of globalisation claims are mainly economic and 
rely on using empirical data to test an ideal type of globalisation. The ideal type 
they use is, they say, an extreme one, but represents what globalisation would be 
if it were occurring and they say it is one that shapes discussions in business and 
political circles. Though they do not address culture they argue that many of the 
changes in culture and politics claimed by globalisation theorists would follow from 
economic globalisation, so that if claims about the latter are found wanting then 
claims about the former look problematic also. What are their main points? (See 
Hirst and Thompson 1996: ch.1). 
 
 There has been internationalisation of financial markets, technology and some 
sections of manufacturing and services, especially since the 1970s, and some 
of these changes put constraints on radical policies in national level 
governance. For instance, it is risky to pursue radical policies at a national level 
because internationalisation allows investment to flee across national 
boundaries more easily.  
 The current highly internationalised economy is not unprecedented. In 
particular the international economy was more open between 1870 and 1914, 
its international dimensions are contingent and some have been interrupted or 
reversed. For instance, Hirst and Thompson outline figures which show high 
levels of trade and migration before 1914, much of which was reversed in the 
inter-war period, showing how globalisation is not going along an evolutionary 
or predetermined path, but one that can stop or even go into reverse.  
 Greater international trade and investment is happening but within existing 
structures rather than there being a new global economic structure developed. 
What is happening is between nations, ie international, especially between 
dominant states or regions, rather than something which has extended globally 
or gone above and beyond nations or the inter-national or inter-regional. 
 Transnational corporations (TNCs) are rare. Most companies are nationally 
based and trade multinationally (ie MNCs rather than TNCs). There is no major 
tendency towards truly global companies. So a company may be based in one 
country and sell its goods or services abroad. But this makes it a national 
company operating in the international marketplace, rather than a global 
company.  
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is concentrated amongst advanced industrial 
economies rather than there being any massive shift of investment and 
employment towards third world countries. The latter remain marginal in trade. 
The exceptions to this are some newly industrialising countries (NICs) in Latin 
American and East Asia.  
 The world economy is not global but trade, investment and financial flows are 
concentrated in the triad of Europe, Japan and North America. Something that 
falls so short of being inclusive on a world-wide scale cannot be seen as a 
global economy.  
 The G3 have the capacity to exert powerful economic governance over 
financial markets but choose not to for reasons of ideology and economic 
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interest. They have an ideological commitment to unfettered finance or find that 
they benefit from it. This is the reason for any restraint in economic governance 
rather than because it is impossible. States, by themselves, or in regional or 
international collaborations have the capacity to regulate the global economy 
and pursue reformist policies if they chose to do so.  
 Radical expansionary and redistributive strategies of national economic 
management are not possible because of domestic and international 
requirements such as norms acceptable to international financial markets. 
Capital would flee if governments were to pursue policies which were too 
radically socialist. Governments and other actors are forced to behave 
differently because of internationalisation. But globalisation theory leads to too 
much of a sense of fatalism, and the injunction that neoliberalism is 
unavoidable because of globalisation is as much ideological as an actual 
inevitability. Politicians may say that neoliberalism is inevitable as much to 
justify policies they are ideologically committed to as because they really are 
inevitable. Reformist strategies at national and international level are possible, 
using existing institutions and practices.  
 
You can see here that Hirst and Thompson argue that in some respects the world 
economy is very internationalised (see also Hirst and Thompson 2000 on the ‘over-
internationalisation’ of the British economy). But they use the word 
‘internationalisation’ rather than ‘globalisation’ and argue that evidence from the 
former is sometime used to justify claims about the latter. They see the world as 
internationalised rather than globalised because of a number of the conclusions in 
the list above: for instance that there are distinct national economies and 
companies; that internationalisation of the economy is restricted to advanced 
economies and the triad rather than being of global extent, ie worldwide; and that 
internationalisation is happening within existing structures rather than creating new 
global ones that go beyond national or inter-national structures.  
 
Let us look now at those taking the third perspective on globalisation. This tries to 
maintain a globalist outlook, one that does not retreat from globalist claims as the 
sceptics do, but attempts to outline a more complex globalism than outlined by the 
first wave of hyperglobalists.  
 
Hay and Marsh – between the second and third waves  
 
Hay and Marsh in their edited book on ‘Demystifying Globalisation’ say that what 
they want to do is ‘cast a critical and in large part sceptical gaze over some of the 
often wildly exaggerated … claims made in the name of globalisation’ (2000: 2-3). 
They say that this echoes the second wave of globalisation theory but that they 
wish to contribute to a third wave approach which has a multi-dimensional view of 
the many processes of globalisation that develop in complex and uneven ways. 
This they see as ‘part of an emerging and distinctive “third wave” of writings on 
globalisation’ (2000: 4).  
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The first wave is seen as one which portrayed globalisation as inevitable, a 
singular process across different areas, eroding the boundaries of nation-states, 
welfare states and societies. It is said that this is a view which is popular in the 
media, business and political worlds, amongst some academics and on the 
neoliberal right as well as the left. It is argued that the first wave perspective is 
sustained by a lack of empirical evidence or its misuse (2000: 4). 
 
The second sceptical wave is seen to have brought empirical evidence to bear in a 
way which has undermined the first globalist wave. Focusing on the critique of 
business globalisation, Hay and Marsh say that the second wave has shown state 
interventionism as effective (against the idea that globalisation undermines the 
nation-state), limits to the mobility of capital and FDI, lack of global convergence in 
economic indicators and policy, a domestic focus to production, the concentration 
of flows of capital in the G3 regions, and precedents for flows of FDI (suggesting 
that globalisation is not new) (2000: 4-5). All of these give empirical reasons to 
doubt the case of the first wave.  
 
In advocating a third wave, Hay and Marsh, while talking of a sceptical and critical 
view, do so within a framework that does not treat globalisation as something they 
are rejecting, as sceptics like Hirst and Thompson do. Their analysis is, therefore, 
one that tries to develop a complex theory of globalisation rather than one that tries 
to debunk it as a phenomenon. As such it can be seen as being, like Held et al’s, 
an attempt to rescue globalisation theory in a more critical and sophisticated form. 
The tone is more sceptical than Held et al’s but their analysis is of a form of 
globalisation, conceptualised in a particular way.   
 
Hay and Marsh praise the second wave but say that it is still derivative of the 
‘globaloney’ of the first wave and that a third wave is needed building on the 
foundations of the second’s criticisms (2000: 6). They argue that this third wave 
needs to see globalisation not as a process or end-state but a tendency to which 
there are counter-tendencies (2000: 6). It is changing and can be reversed or go in 
different directions.  And, as Rosenberg (2000) has also argued, causes of 
globalisation and the agents behind it need to be identified rather than globalisation 
being seen as a cause in itself or inevitable and not under the control of subjects. It 
could be governments and businesses that drive globalisation rather than 
globalisation that is determining their behaviour. From a third wave point of view 
globalisation is tendential, contingent and limited.  
 
If these things need to be taken forward by a third wave the implication is that the 
second wave does not do so. If the new work that needs to be done involves that 
of a new wave then the second wave must be lacking to the extent that it could not 
be improved by extra work within its existing framework.  
 
Hay and Marsh argue that they are developing innovations which differentiate them 
from the second wave (2000: 7) and that they ‘see the need to initiate a break with 
the second-wave globalisation literature’ (2000: 13). Following this they identify 
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four common themes of their book (2000: 7-13) which they say indicate ‘some of 
the central themes that will need to be taken up if a third wave is to develop’ (2000: 
13). One is that the discourse of globalisation yields material effects. For instance 
governments reacting to capital flight may be reacting just as much to discourses 
about capital flight as its reality. Politicians’ statements that globalisation means 
governments have no choice but to pursue business-friendly policies may be as 
much a response to the discourse of globalisation as to reality in which this actually 
may not be the only possible path. Or politicians may themselves be the agents of 
this discourse which justifies policies which are chosen for ideological reasons but 
presented to the electorate as necessary because of globalisation.  
 
A second theme is that in previous waves globalisation is given a causal power it 
does not have. In fact, Hay and Marsh argue, globalisation is more an effect of 
other causes than a cause itself and is something that is contingent, caused by 
political will and subject to de-globalisation. Rather than being inevitable and out of 
control, as the phrase ‘runaway world’ implies (Giddens 1999), and driving other 
economic, political and cultural processes, globalisation could be caused by the 
decisions of companies and politicians, by capitalism and the interests of states, 
and so something that is under control and could be taken in other directions or 
reversed if companies and politicians made other decisions.  
 
Third, globalisation is seen as something heterogeneous with varying effects in 
different forms and locations rather than something which is homogeneous and 
general. So financial globalisation is different to cultural globalisation, they may be 
proceeding at different paces and extents, and either of them may have different 
effects in different areas, for example American culture proliferating more widely in, 
say, Britain or Japan than North Korea or China.  
 
Fourth, Hay and Marsh stress that there is an interplay between culture and 
economy in globalisation rather than these being two separate spheres best 
explained by different disciplines. Cultural globalisation may follow from the 
attempt to sell it, from economic globalisation and the spread of capitalism. Or 
economic globalisation may be driven by people believing in discourses of it, so 
resulting from the culture of globalisation.  
 
But all four of these observations in fact affirm arguments made by second wave 
sceptics rather than moving analysis on to a third wave. Third wave critique aims to 
move on from the second wave but in practice confirms the latter. Let’s see here 
where Hay and Marsh are reinforcing second wave arguments rather than moving 
on to a new third wave as suggested.  
 
First, globalisation is a discourse and sometimes subjects’ actions are a response 
to this rather than to any reality. Hay and Marsh put this proposition forward as one 
of the third wave innovations differentiating it from previous waves. But this 
reinforces what Hirst and Thompson have said. Hirst and Thompson argue that the 
norms of international financial markets put restrictions on radical policies. But they 
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also argue that evidence of internationalisation is used to falsely justify that 
globalisation is happening. Globalisation theory, they say, leads to a false fatalism 
and they suggest that the argument that neoliberalism is inevitable is more 
ideological than a reality. Reforming strategies are in fact possible at national and 
international levels – perhaps redistribution, regulations to make companies more 
responsible towards workers and communities, or increased spending on health, 
education and welfare. Hay and Marsh have gone into greater detail on the power 
of discourses of globalisation in their work than Hirst and Thompson have with their 
more economically focused approach (for example, see Hay and Rosamond 2002 
and Marsh, Smith and Holti 2005 and see also, for instance, Cameron and Palan 
2004 and Bruff 2005). Nevertheless, on this question Hay and Marsh reinforce 
second wave claims rather than moving on from them as they say their point does.  
 
Second, Hay and Marsh say that an innovating and differentiating analysis is one 
that sees globalisation as the effect of causes and agency rather than a cause 
itself and inevitable. Hirst and Thompson see what is going on as 
internationalisation rather than globalisation. But the historical account they outline 
shows internationalisation as the consequence of actors’ decisions as much as a 
cause or subject-less process. For instance, as we have seen, they say that it is 
the ideology and interests of G3 actors that leads internationalisation to go in the 
direction it does, rather than in an alternative more regulated direction which would 
be possible. Again Hay and Marsh are reinforcing the second wave rather than 
providing something that moves on from it.  
 
Third, for Hay and Marsh a third wave innovation is to develop the analysis of 
globalisation as something heterogeneous with specific effects rather than 
homogeneous and general. But again this reiterates the findings of sceptics rather 
than moving beyond them. Hirst and Thompson’s see more advanced 
internationalisation in financial markets than in other sectors. They see 
internationalisation as variable and reversible in different historical conjunctures, 
the belle époque having been a high point of globalisation after which there were 
reversals (eg 1930s) and advances (eg 1970s), and they argue that some 
advanced and newly industrialising countries are more integrated into the 
international economy while others are relatively outside the world of trade and 
investment. In short, Hirst and Thompson show globalisation to be a very uneven 
process.  
 
Fourth, in third wave analysis there is by Hay and Marsh said to be an interplay 
between culture and economics rather than these being separate spheres of study 
by different disciplines. But Hirst and Thompson argue for such an interplay. They 
say that their book focuses on economics but that they feel if there are doubts 
about the globalisation of the world economy then there have to be doubts also 
about the globalisation of culture, because the latter is strongly connected to the 
former. Hirst and Thompson’s points do not analyse culture and its relationship 
with economics, and Hay and Marsh pay more attention to this area, but they do 
posit this relationship. So Hay and Marsh’s suggestion of analysis of this interplay 
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is within a framework like the second wave’s rather than one that moves on from it 
except in that it pursues it more concretely.  
 
Hay and Marsh also say that in the third wave globalisation can be seen as a 
tendency with counter-tendencies rather than a fact or a process which is going 
only in one direction. But Hirst and Thompson’s analysis shows that globalisation is 
far from accomplished and that internationalisation has had moments of advance 
and moments of reversal and that it is within the capacity of agents like the G3 to 
change its direction. As with the previous four points it seems that the innovations 
Hay and Marsh are arguing for are not so much innovations as, in practice, 
confirmations of and continuous with second wave sceptical analysis.  
 
So, many of the approaches and insights that Hay and Marsh argue are needed 
already exist within the second wave. What is by implication a suggestion of limits 
in the second wave in practice reinforces it by raising and endorsing points it has 
already made. The general argument of this article follows this line – that third 
wavers try to move on from second wave thinking, proposing a more advanced 
qualified globalism. But in doing so they emphasise features highlighted by the 
second wave and so reinforce the second wave’s sceptical approach.  
 
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Hay and Marsh identify their book as 
‘somewhere between the second and third waves of the globalisation debate’ 
(2000: 7) and that they ‘do not regard the present volume as unambiguously 
pioneering this third wave’.  But this qualification, along with their theoretical 
assertions which in practice replicate second wave analysis, undermines their 
claim that they are initiating a third wave and moving in the direction of innovating 
and differentiation from the second wave. The qualifications and the arguments 
they make reinforce the second wave rather than show a move forward from it.  
 
Held et al – transformationalists, a modified globalism 
 
The situation with Held et al does not exactly replicate that in Hay and Marsh’s 
analysis and its relationship with the sceptics. Hay and Marsh are more sceptical in 
tone and Held et al more globalist in leaning. But there are some parallels between 
the way these two sets of third wavers deal with the sceptics and globalisation. 
Held et al try to distance themselves from the sceptics, saying that the latter have 
attacked a false ideal type and that globalisation is a real process. But they argue 
that globalisation needs to be put forward as more complex and uncertain than it is 
by first wave hyperglobalists. Held et al advance a third perspective, 
transformationalism, which outlines such a more complex picture of globalisation. 
This is done most notably in their book Global Transformations (1999) but also in a 
number of other places - for instance in the Open Democracy (2002) debate 
between David Held and Paul Hirst (and Held and McGrew 2003).  
 
My argument is that there are elements in Held et al’s arguments which go in 
different directions to each other. Held et al are trying to defend globalisation 
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theory by putting forward a modified version of it. But the qualifications and 
complexities they add to globalisation theory lead to confirmation of many claims in 
the sceptics’ theses and so do not undermine scepticism or support globalisation 
as much as is claimed.  
 
Let us look at what Held et al set out as the transformationalist position and what 
they criticise about scepticism. The examples given below to illustrate 
transformationalism are my own. Held et al tend to focus most on transformations 
to political forms while Hirst and Thompson, as we have seen, focus on 
economics. But there is still substantial overlap in the areas they focus their 
analysis on.  
 
According to the transformationalist position (Held et al 1999: 7-14): 
 
 Contemporary globalisation is historically unprecedented. At the same time, 
transformationalists say, it is a long-term historical process with pre-modern 
forms. So there may have been trade and migration, for instance between Asia, 
the Middle-East and fringes of Europe way back in pre-modern times. But 
technological and political changes since the second world war have led to an 
unprecedented growth in the extent, velocity, volume and intensity of things like 
global media communications, economic interdependency between countries, 
international political organisations, etc.  
 Globalisation involves profound transformative change and is a central driving 
force behind changes reshaping the world. There are not clear distinctions 
between the domestic and the international in economic, social and political 
processes. For instance, aspects of national culture such as media, film, 
religion, food, fashion and music are so infused with inputs from international 
sources that national culture is no longer separate from the international. This is 
a transformatory driving force because this globalisation changes peoples’ life 
experiences.  
 Economies are becoming deterritorialised, global and transnational. This is 
happening through, for example, the mobility of capital across national 
boundaries, the role of multinational corporations and interdependency 
between different nations’ economies.  
 While they are still legally sovereign, nation-states’ powers, functions and 
authority are being reconstituted by international governance and law, by global 
ecological, transportation and communications developments and non-territorial 
organisations such as multinational corporations (MNCs) and transnational 
social movements. The nation-state is not a self-governing, autonomous unit 
(although they say states never have had complete sovereignty) and authority 
is more diffused. Held et al also say that states have become more activist and 
their power is not necessarily diminished but is being reconstituted. This is 
unlike both the globalists’ claim that nation-state sovereignty has ended and 
what is said to be the sceptic position that nothing much has changed.  
 Territorial boundaries are still important but the idea that they are the primary 
markers of modern life has become more problematic. Economic, social and 
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political activities are locally rooted but become territorially disembedded or 
reterritorialised in new forms of localisation and nationalisation. So a company 
may have roots in a particular territorial area but become disembedded as its 
workforce become internationally located or its products sold internationally. It 
may be reterritorialised in terms of the new places where the workforce is 
located or the way its products are tailored for markets in different areas. Types 
of music may start off from a locality but become disembedded as they are 
performed or sold globally, or take on global influences. They can become 
influences on, and infused into, other types of music globally or in other national 
places where fusions of music create new forms of local or national culture in 
that area, ie new forms of localisation and nationalisation.   
 Transformationalists say they do not reduce the world to a single fixed ideal 
type, as other perspectives do, and that they recognise it is contradictory and 
contingent. They feel that globalists and sceptics reduce the world to global or 
non-global types respectively, without realising how contradictory it is, with 
aspects of both and middle elements where things like cultures may stay 
national while what the national is is changed by global inputs - so a mixture of 
the national and global. And they see globalists or sceptics as suggesting 
inevitabilities when whether the world becomes more or less global is not 
predetermined but is open to going in different possible directions.  
 Sceptics are said to see the world as a singular process when actually it is 
differentiated with different patterns in different areas of life. So, for instance, 
some types of globalisation (eg finance) may be more globalised than others 
(eg corporations), and some countries in the world (for instance those most 
needing of inward investment) may experience the impact of global finance 
more than others.  
 Held et al argue that sceptics are empiricist because statistical evidence is 
taken to confirm, qualify or reject the globalisation thesis when more qualitative 
evidence and interpretive analysis is needed. Migration or trade, for example, 
may (arguably) be no more globalised now than in the belle époque in terms of 
quantitative indicators such as value of goods exchanged or numbers of people 
on the move. But the qualitative impact of migration and trade on economies, 
politics and culture could be greater in the current period. Quantitative 
indicators of limited change do not necessarily demonstrate lack of qualitative 
change.  
 There is a single global system that nearly all societies are part of but not global 
convergence or a single world society. National societies and systems are 
enmeshed in patterns of interregional networks but these are different from 
global integration which does not exist because it implies too much singularity, 
and different from convergence which does not exist because that would 
assume homogeneity. For example, there may be global economic 
interdependency but that does not mean there is global convergence on 
economic factors like prices or interest rates. So a global economic system can 
exist but without global convergence or a single economy.  
 Globalisation involves new patterns of stratification across and within societies, 
some becoming enmeshed and some marginalised but in new configurations 
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different to the old core-periphery, North-South and first world-third world 
classifications. It follows that globalisation is not universalisation because 
globalisation is not experienced to the same extent by all people. In place of the 
core-periphery model of global inequality there is now a model that shows a 
middle group of developing countries in Latin America and Asia that have 
grown significantly and become more integrated into the global economy, so 
lifting themselves out of the periphery, but others, some African countries for 
example, who have become more debilitated and left out in the periphery. So a 
bipolar model is replaced by a more complex stratification with both greater 
inclusion of some but also exclusion and greater polarisation between the top 
and bottom. Globalisation here has an uneven effect, some becoming more 
integrated into it and others more excluded.  
 Transformationalists say that unlike hyperglobalists and sceptics they recognise 
that the future direction of globalisation is uncertain rather than teleological and 
linear with a given future end-state. So rather than globalisation being destined 
to sweep ahead, or the status quo being the predetermined future, 
transformationalists are saying that the international future is open and can be 
decided in a number of directions by factors such as the choices of big 
corporations and governments or the influence of civil society and social 
movements in the world.  
 Government strategies for dealing with the globalised world are said to include 
neoliberalism, the developmental or catalytic state and more outward looking 
strategies based on international regulation, which is a line of government 
action that global or cosmopolitan democrats like Held et al favour (Held and 
McGrew 2002). So with openness in the paths that globalisation could take in 
the future, comes a number of options that governments can take to influence 
that direction, including economic liberalism, greater state intervention in 
guiding the future of economies and societies, or global governance of the 
world economy and global problems.  
 
Transformationalists and sceptics compared 
 
But how much does this transformationalist third wave as outlined by Held et al 
rescue globalisation in a modified form and undermine the sceptics? Let us go 
through some of Held et al’s points.  
 
There is no doubt that there are differences between the transformationalists and 
sceptics: on definition (should the processes they see be defined as 
internationalisation or globalisation?); on historical periodisation (is current 
globalisation unprecedented or the period between 1870-1914 the most 
globalised?); and normative proposals (divergence between seeing nation-states 
and international blocs or global democracy as the bases for future political action).  
 
Hirst and Thompson are accused of attacking an extreme ideal type to undermine 
the case for globalisation. This is a fair point and Hirst and Thompson agree that 
this is what they do. They take a model of what they think globalisation would be 
 19 
were it to exist and show that this model does not exist in reality. However this is 
an ideal type that shapes business and political debate and Held et al themselves 
justify their own transformationalist position in relation to a strong hyperglobalist 
position that they criticise. More important than these points, however, is that the 
ideal type that Hirst and Thompson criticise portrays something that they say does 
not exist. In comparing transformationalists and sceptics views it is more sensible 
to compare like with like. Rather than comparing Held et al’s outline of global 
transformations that they say are happening with a model of what Hirst and 
Thompson say is not happening, it is more useful to compare what Hirst and 
Thompson say is going on in the world – internationalisation – with what Held et al 
say is going on in the world – global transformation. Then we can see if there are 
real differences in their positions that need to be evaluated. We can do this by 
going through the transformationalist points outlined above.  
 
Held et al say that contemporary globalisation is historically unprecedented but that 
there are earlier pre-modern forms of globalisation. This sounds like a 
contradictory statement, but it means that there are precedents for globalisation 
but none as intense, extensive, fast and of such great volume and impact as at 
present. Sceptics and transformationalists may not disagree that globalisation is 
something quite long-running. But there is a difference between Hirst and 
Thompson’s view that its heyday was the 1870-1914 period and that it is less 
intense now and Held et al’s view that the current period is the most advanced.  
 
Held et al argue that there are not clear differences between domestic and 
international processes. This is something sceptics agree on. As can be seen from 
the summary of the sceptics’ position above, they see domestic economies as very 
much internationalised, for instance in terms of finance, trade and investment. 
Where there is a difference is on whether international processes are 
characterised as ‘global’ or not but their view on the interpenetration of the national 
with the international does not mark transformationalism off from scepticism.  
 
Held et al argue that economies are becoming deterritorialised, global and 
transnational. This sounds like a more radical position than that of the sceptics but 
Held et al qualify this argument with the view that territorial boundaries are still 
important. Economic, social and political activities are locally rooted and become 
territorially disembedded or reterritorialised in new forms of localisation and 
nationalisation. How different is this from the sceptic position that there are national 
economies trading internationally, and companies with local bases whose 
production, trading and investment activities go on beyond this location? The 
emphasis on deterritorialisation and disembeddeness goes beyond the sceptical 
position but rootedness and reterritorialisation does not.  
 
The view of nation-states that Held et al have is of agents, legally sovereign with 
their power not necessarily diminished but reconstituted, more activist, but with 
authority diffused and lacking self-governing autonomous powers. For example, a 
nation-state may have reconstituted itself in regional and international 
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organisations, so having its authority diffused more and self-governing power 
diminished by this and by global economic pressures. But it is still legally 
sovereign, taking an active role in so reconstituting itself in a more globalised world 
in a way which maintains or even enhances its powers. This is said to be unlike the 
sceptic position that nothing much has changed. However this distinction from the 
sceptical position is problematic on three counts.  
 
First of all sceptics do not say nothing has changed. They say a lot has changed, 
in the earlier belle époque period, and in the 1970s and 1980s, but that this does 
not mean that we live in a globalised era. As noted in the summary of their position 
above, they argue that there have been big transformations in the international 
economy, although within existing structures. Companies have to act differently 
and the norms of international financial markets have come to restrict what it is 
possible for nation-states to do, for instance that this rules out radical macro-
economic policies.  
 
Second, sceptics agree that nation-states lack complete sovereignty and have to 
share this. For instance they outline the role of international organisations and 
international finance in the world and, as we have seen, constraints on radical 
redistributional politics at state level. Their qualification is that this has always been 
the case and is not new. But they do not depart from the view that there is not clear 
sovereignty that does not have to be shared.  
 
Thirdly, they agree with the view of the activist state, but if anything the 
transformationalists’ emphasis on this gives credence to the sceptic view that 
nation-states are important actors in the world stage with the power at national and 
international levels to determine the forms that what is called globalisation takes. 
Sceptics argue that nation-states have the autonomy to determine the future of 
globalisation and Held et al’s outline of alternative strategies such as neoliberalism, 
the developmental state, the catalytic state and cosmopolitan democracy seems to 
reinforce the view that, in their globalised world, nation-states have some 
autonomy and power to determine the future, in the way that Hirst and Thompson 
also argue. This is not to say that the transformationalists and sceptics are in 
complete harmony on the role of the nation-state in the current global or 
international world. But it does seem that the qualifications in the 
transformationalist analysis affirm many of the arguments of the sceptical case as 
much as rebutting them.  
 
For Held et al one difference between the transformationalist and sceptical 
positions is that the former recognise the multidimensional, contingent, 
contradictory nature of the world and its uncertain direction whereas the latter see 
it as singular and linear and with a given end-state. But this appears to misinterpret 
the sceptical position. Hirst and Thompson focus on the economy rather than other 
areas so there is not too much indication of how they see globalisation as it affects 
different areas. But they argue that internationalisation has many different effects 
in different parts of the world, with much activity being concentrated in advanced 
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economies while other areas of the world are less integrated. They state that 
internationalisation is not linear but is subject to reversals, such as that after the 
belle époque, and that the idea that globalisation is predetermined and inevitable is 
a myth used to justify neoliberal policies, the reality being that nation-states 
individually or organised internationally have it in their power to alter the course of 
internationalisation. The difference from scepticism created by the 
transformationalists here is based on a misunderstanding of what the sceptics say. 
In fact what transformationalists argue on these points seems to be in accordance 
with the sceptics.   
 
Finally, transformationalists argue that there is a single global system in which all 
societies are enmeshed, something that appears to differ from the sceptic position 
that much significant activity in the international economy is concentrated in the 
triad of Japan, the EU and North America, with some NICs up and coming into this 
sphere of influence, and other parts of the world much less integrated. However 
the differences seem smaller when it is considered that transformationalists outline 
a situation in which, while there is a single world system, they say there is not 
global convergence or a single world society, that they see patterns of stratification 
across and within societies involving some becoming enmeshed and some 
marginalised, and in which globalisation is not universal because globalisation is 
not experienced to the same extent by all people. The unevenness of integration 
into the global system comes closer to the sceptics’ outline which leads the latter to 
the conclusion that there is no global economy because of such patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion.  
 
The Politics of Globalisation 
 
So, attempts to rebut scepticism and defend a modified globalism seem often to 
actually share substantive ground with the sceptics’ analysis, one that raises 
doubts about the reality of globalisation. Rhetorically transformationalists are 
stronger in defending globalism as a fact, despite such commonality with the 
sceptics, and this may be partly what leads to one area of significant difference. 
Despite the shared ground with scepticism, transformationalists remain committed 
to a globalist outlook and their normative suggestions about a politics which can 
respond to globalisation puts strong emphasis on cosmopolitan global democracy 
(see Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 1995; Archibugi 2004; Beck 2006; Fine 2006). 
This involves global political fora in which different communities and interests can 
participate to reach agreements on issues, many of which have a global character 
and cannot be solved purely at national levels. Issues like human rights and war, 
ecological problems, drugs and crime, economic instability and inequality are seen 
as global rather than national problems which require global co-ordination or global 
interventions to be solved. Cosmopolitans look to global cosmopolitan fora or 
international interventions, based in global cosmopolitan consciousness, to solve 
such problems.  
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Sceptics whose analysis does not lead to such globalist conclusions do not share 
this faith in global politics (see Zolo 1997 and 2002; Hirst 2001; Open Democracy 
2002). This is because sceptics do not believe that powerful western states would 
be willing to put up with the political equalisation that global democracy would 
allow. They would resist political equality and inclusivity and try to maintain their 
superior power in global fora. They would use global politics against others when in 
their interests and evade being subjected to it where it was against their interests. 
There are important conflicts of interest and ideology and over resources between 
nation-states, increasing as a consequence of ecological problems such as climate 
change. Solutions to global problems would have to involve the interests or 
ideologies of some being favoured and those of others gone against – there are 
not win-win solutions to such problems. So conflict is more likely in global politics 
and the co-operative consciousness that cosmopolitanism would rely on is unlikely.   
 
An example of some of these issues can be found in the role of the USA in 
international politics. It tries to maintain its power against equality in international 
institutions (eg in the UN Security Council), uses those international institutions as 
a basis for pursuing its interests against others but exempts itself from them or 
bypasses them when this is not so. It will support or undermine international 
agreements (eg on global warming, international justice and rights, and nuclear 
proliferation) on a selective basis depending on its own ideology and interests, 
whether economic, political or geo-strategic.   
 
Cosmopolitans are well-intentioned, right to be concerned about issues such as 
ecology, rights and inequality and to see such problems as global and solutions as 
needing often to be transnational. But if cosmopolitan politics is unlikely or 
undesirable for the reasons mentioned what might an alternative politics to solve 
such issues involve? For sceptics the future lies in nation-states acting alone or, 
because such problems are transnational, acting together multilaterally (rather than 
globally), for instance in regional blocs or alliances of the likeminded. So this 
involves not universal or global agreements but multilaterally and bilaterally agreed 
blocs and alliances based on shared objectives, interests and ideologies. It may be 
better for states and other political actors to ally transnationally with those actors 
who are likeminded and with shared interests rather than trying for cosmopolitan 
consciousness at a global level were many have opposed interests and ideologies 
and are more powerful. This is a politics that works more with a reality of divisions, 
antagonism and state alliances than the global commonality and agreement 
required for global cosmopolitan democracy. Such alliances could be forged, for 
instance, between states or movements who see themselves as anti-neoliberal or 
anti-imperialist, such as left-wing governments in Latin America and other places, 
the non-aligned movement, or the global justice movement (eg see Gill 2000; Gills 
2000; Motta 2006; which is not to say that there aren’t aspects to the practices of 
some such governments which are not defensible and where there have been 
failures).  
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International institutions exist and have to be engaged with so such actors should 
participate in cosmopolitan institutions. But they will also see these as representing 
particular as much as global universal interests and as a tool for the powerful as 
much as equality and democracy. As such their politics has to operate also outside 
such institutions, with agents forming alliances with each other, using what 
resources (eg, energy resources and human expertise) they have for mutual 
assistance, in a politics of conflict (rather than cosmopolitan universality) against 
powerful forces where these preserve inequality or lack of democracy or are 
amongst those who transgress human rights and are behind ecological problems 
or war.  
 
This politics is neither statist nor globally centralist (although it uses both levels). It 
does not ally a scepticism about cosmopolitan politics with anti-interventionism, 
pacifism or inertia. It favours activism and intervention transnationally in issues of 
global concern and relevance but through a recognition of conflict because these 
issues involve conflicting rather than common interests and objectives; and 
transnationally and beyond the state through multilateral and bilateral blocs of 
actors with common agendas and interests where they exist or can be forged 
rather than through the isolated state or global universals. This is an alternative to 
statism and centralism/globalism, operating at both these levels but also at a level 
in between of conflictual politics and selected transnational multilateralism. It 
involves harnessing the interests of the poorer and less powerful rather than 
globalist hopes or a visionary holism.  
 
Furthermore, transnational politics needs to be not just procedural and based on 
institutional solutions to global problems, for instance cosmopolitan democracy and 
international law. It has to have a substance beyond legal or institutional 
procedures being advocated because many of the problems outlined above are 
ones which require particular sorts of substantive policies as much as the right sort 
of institutional means. Different institutional means can lead to varying substantive 
policies and the choice of the latter is as important as the appropriate means being 
chosen.  
 
The differences in sceptics and transformationalists’ normative political conclusions 
seem to stem more from the transformationalists’ globalist conclusions than from 
the substance of their arguments which in practice often share similar ground with 
the more sceptical approach. Transformationalists’ analysis, as outlined above, 
gives a picture of: unevenness of integration; inequality, stratification and power; 
nation-states (albeit reconstituted ones) for whom there are different possible 
activist strategies; and reterritorialisation and regional blocs. On this basis the 
politics of cosmopolitan global democracy they favour seem unlikely. Their analysis 
shows up inequalities and conflicts which would make it difficult for global 
agreements to be realised. These are often between nation-states who remain in 
their outline still powerful actors. The more appropriate political conclusion from 
such a picture of the world order would seem to be one which recognises 
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inequality and conflict, nation-states and regional or multilateral likeminded blocs, 
as identified by sceptics as more likely structures in future politics.  
 
One problem, then, with transformationalism is that in drawing globalist 
conclusions they are led to globalist politics. But if it is the case that what they say 
actually lends more credence to the sceptic case then such global politics may only 
offer some hope. It may be better to have a more realistic view of politics as about 
economic and political conflicts of a sort that do not lend themselves to global 
democracy but more to nation-states, regional and other blocs, alliances, and 
struggles between them and other opposed interests in civil society, rather than 
universality and global agreement. One reason to get the analysis of globalisation 
right in the three waves is to make sure that the political conclusions reached are 
the best ones.  
 
So the transformationalist approach tries to rebut the sceptics while rescuing 
globalisation theory in a more sophisticated form than that in which hyperglobalists 
have advanced it. But there are some problems with this. In general 
transformationalism is a perspective which rhetorically defends globalisation but in 
practice bolsters up quite a bit of the sceptical case. One reason for this is that 
transformationalists add significant qualifications and complexities to their outline 
of globalisation. This brings them on to greater shared ground with the sceptics 
than it appears at face value. In many areas both perspectives share key elements 
of outlook, as shown above. A second reason is that transformationalists, as we 
have seen above, do not always give an accurate picture of scepticism. 
Sometimes pictures of scepticism are given which make it possible to dismiss it. 
But when the sceptical view is looked at more carefully it is possible to see that on 
occasion scepticism does not quite say what it is said to and its perspective stands 
up to criticism.  
 
Scholte – a qualified globalism 
 
In some ways Jan Aart Scholte’s (2005) attempt to modify globalisation theory yet 
hang on to its key claims leads to similar results as Held et al’s analysis. Scholte 
does not explicitly specify first, second and third waves or perspectives in 
globalisation theory in the way that Hay and Marsh (2000) and Held et al (1999) 
do. But he does attempt to provide a more complex concept of globalisation with 
qualifications, one that goes beyond an extreme concept of globalisation but does 
not go as far as the sceptics. In doing so he hopes to defend an idea of 
globalisation as a reality rather than allow it to be debunked. In these ways he falls 
into the third wave post-sceptic camp.  
 
Scholte argues that globalisation involves supraterritorial rather than transplanetary 
relations. The latter are more like the international links that sceptics say 
characterise world relations. Transplanetary connectivity, he says, involves 
relations between different parts of the world. These have become more dense, 
involve more people, more often, more extensively, more intensively and in greater 
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volume. However they have been around for many centuries and are essentially 
inter-national links between different parts of the world.  
 
Supraterrritoriality, however, he argues is relatively new and breaks with 
territorialist geography. This involves not just an intensification of transplanetary 
links but also different types of global connectivity which go above and beyond 
territorial units. They transcend territorial geography and are delinked from it. 
Examples may include transworld simultaneity (eg people across the world 
consuming the same make of coffee), or transworld instantaneity (eg international 
telephone calls). Other examples of supraterritorialism he gives include travel by 
jet plane, people movements, consumption, telecommunications, global media, 
finance, ecological problems, global organisations, global health problems, 
international law, and global consciousness (eg in global sports events and global 
consciousness of human rights).  
 
Supraterritoriality involves more than the compression of time relative to space 
characteristic of intensified transplanetary connectivity. It involves social relations 
that also go beyond territorial space. The difference between the time-space 
compression of transplanetary links and supraterritoriality is of a qualitative kind. 
Territorial domains, for Scholte, remain important but do not define the whole 
macro spatial framework which now has supra-territorial dimensions.  
 
Scholte makes some qualifications to this picture. In the second edition of his book 
on globalisation, which I am referring to here, he drops the word 
‘deterritorialisation’ previously used to encapsulate global relations because it 
implies that territory does not matter any more and he suggests this may have 
been taking things too far. The emphasis is on the term ‘supraterritoriality’, which 
captures something that goes above and beyond territory, but in which it is implicit 
that territory is still present even if transcended. He argues that territorialism 
remains important – for instance in production, governance, ecology and identities 
and that globalism has not eliminated it. All of these examples have supra-
territorial dimensions but also have territorially rooted aspects to them. The world, 
he says, is both territorial and global and there is no pure globality that exists 
independently of territorial spaces. The world is territorial and supraterritorial and 
both intersect. The global is not a domain unto itself separate from regional, 
national, provincial and local levels. There is an intersection of all these.  
 
The problem here is that Scholte’s discussion, which is intended to defend the 
concept and reality of globalisation by giving a more complex and nuanced 
account of it, introduces qualifications and reservations which effectively bring his 
analysis on to common ground with quite a bit of sceptical perspectives.   
 
Many of the examples that Scholte gives, some mentioned above, originate from a 
time before the post-1960s period in which globalisation, he says, has taken off. 
Also many of them are of transplanetary connectivity rather than of the 
supraterritoriality which goes beyond territory. World sports events, for instance, 
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are composed of national teams competing with one another in which spectators 
often identify passionately with national identities. Movements of people involve 
patterns and experiences which are heavily affected by what the national origins 
and destinations of the migrants are. Climate change exhibits clear variations in 
the national origins of the problems, and national power differences and conflicts in 
the negotiation of solutions. These doubts over the supraterritorial character of his 
examples are reflected also in Scholte’s qualification I have mentioned, which 
having posited supra-territorial relations then says that such relations are not 
beyond territory but are embedded in it.  
 
In short, Scholte’s outline shows a similar pattern to the arguments of Hay and 
Marsh (2000) and Held et al (1999). An argument is set out which it is said will 
defend globalisation. It will show how complex globalisation is. But the 
qualifications made to do this sometimes undermine the globalist conclusions that 
are reached. In general the way third wave transformationalists try to combine 
globalism with qualifications sometimes means they are less coherent than first 
wave globalists or sceptics and end up giving support to one or other of the other 
waves or, in differing ways, to both of the positions they are criticising at the same 
time. (Rosenberg’s 2000 critique of Scholte comes to similar conclusions).  
 
Conclusions 
 
I have argued that the third wave tries to construct a more complex globalisation 
theory than that which came in the first wave. It is argued by third wavers that this 
more complex picture shows the reality of globalisation today, one which 
undermines sceptics’ claims that we live at best in an era of internationalisation 
rather than of a new global plane above and beyond this.  
 
But it is perhaps no coincidence that Hay and Marsh say that their theory aims to 
move towards a third wave but has not got there yet. This may well be because to 
do so would involve abandoning a second wave which their conclusions seem to 
consolidate rather than show to be in need of moving on from. Held et al argue for 
a globalist theory and globalist normative conclusions, but many of their 
substantive arguments seem to outline a picture of a world system which is 
sometimes quite like that suggested by the sceptics. A modified globalism is set 
out in a way which sometimes seems in detail as close to the sceptics as to 
globalisation theory. Scholte’s outline follows this pattern too. This phenomenon in 
the three waves literature has gone unidentified as discussions have developed. 
The aim of this article has been to revisit this field to identify this problem in the 
literature and bring out its implications.   
 
It is probably significant that an early contribution to the idea of waves in 
globalisation theory, that by Kofman and Youngs (1996), suggests only two waves, 
the second, which they argue for, seems to outline views which both sceptics and 
transformationalists have been putting forward.  
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Kofman and Youngs argue that globalisation theory has been too generalising and 
universalising and has not paid enough attention to the specificities of what 
globalisation involves in particular contexts.   For them if globalisation is something 
new, it is also a reformulation of the old. Old relations are evident in new forms, 
which also involve inequality, politics and power. Power is very one way, from the 
West, but small states have been able to participate and shape debates through 
collaboration with each other.  
 
Capital has flowed more freely but states have been stricter on controlling 
immigration, ie people movements. States are retaining sovereignty but this is 
being reshaped and shifting because of things like the rise of regional institutions. 
There are global flows of media, communications, technology and finance but 
rather than place being obliterated, such flows are articulated and concretised in 
specific ways in particular places and these places are the intersections of the 
local, regional, national and international.  
 
This perspective does not distinguish between a sceptical and post-sceptical 
outlook or between scepticism and transformationalism. Just as Hay and Marsh 
(2000) have found it as yet not possible to move beyond the second wave to a 
desired third wave, Kofman and Youngs outline only a second wave. This outline is 
one that is consistent with both sceptical and transformationalist perspectives that 
have been discussed in this article. There are differences in the conclusions that 
sceptical and transformationalist perspectives come to, on definition, periodisation, 
and normative politics, for instance. But the areas of underlying substantive 
analysis, exemplified in Kofman and Young’s second wave which can straddle both 
perspectives, suggest that differences on globalisation between sceptics and 
transformationalists can be exaggerated. Transformationalists share many of the 
doubts of the sceptics in practice, and express them in their own analyses, but 
move away from them when coming to more globalist conclusions.  
 
Politically these conclusions are important. If transformationalists are basing 
normative globalist proposals on an analysis which shares with the sceptics a view 
of a world of unevenness of integration, stratification, reconstituted but active 
nation-states with different possible options, reterritorialisation and regional blocs 
then the politics of cosmopolitan global democracy that they come down on the 
side of seems unlikely. A politics of power, inequality and conflict, via nation-states, 
regional blocs and political alliances between actors with similar interests and 
ideologies, over resources and diverging economic and political interests, one that 
is identified by sceptics as the future, seems the more relevant one to be engaging 
with.  
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